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BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

THE CENTURY WAR BOOK

PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL EDITION



PART XIV

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG CONTINUED

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(COMMANDER OF THE BESIEGING ARMIES)
(CONTINUED FROM PART XIII)

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(CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE DEFENSES)

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

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CHATTANOOGA

BY GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT, U. S. A.
(COMMANDER OF THE UNION ARMY)
(CONTINUED IN PART XV)



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
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THE FIGHT IN THE CRATER AFTER THE EXPLOSION OF THE UNION MINE UNDER THE CONFEDERATE FORT ON THE JACKSON ROAD, JUNE 25, 1863.

tary engineering, should, in addition to their other duties, assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army [General Robert Macfeely], begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for, unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large man—weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege-guns except six 32-pounders, and there were none in the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large caliber, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries, where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection, sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets, far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these,

logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket-balls, thinking, no doubt, that, bursting over the men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of the shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. [See Colonel Lockett's statement on page 218.]

The enemy could not resort to the method we did to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon, and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve-pounder shells, and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work, but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy, the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were 220 guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned, and commanded by the navy.


We were now as strong for defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us. But I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the East. He had at this time a larger force than I had prior to the battle of Champion's Hill. . . .

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this


We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. When we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation, and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result.

We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three points on the Jackson road in front of Ransom's brigade a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the en-



DOUBLE CAVE IN THE "RICBY HILL."



"SKY PARLOR HILL," A CONFEDERATE SIGNAL-STATION DURING THE SIEGE, AND (PICTURES ABOVE AND BELOW) CAVES OF THE KIND IN WHICH RESIDENTS OF VICKSBURG SOUGHT REFUGE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT BY THE FLEET.

From photographs.

time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haynes's Bluff to the Big Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haynes's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black, at the railroad crossing, batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits, where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

CAVE NEAR THE MACHINE-SHOP.

emy's parapet. In fact, this parapet was also our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill, consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June, at 3 o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy, having failed to reach our mine, had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the counter-mine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been underground at work, when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but was terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up. "Dunno, Massa, but t'ink 'bout three mile," was the reply. General Logan commanded at this point, and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.


As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized upon by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. From here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. The compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and then roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy

continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with port-fires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was consequently started, which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants, and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and of pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three different

points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted despatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us, in order to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no forcible effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to each other — where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets — that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week



VICKSBURG, FROM THE RIVER.
From a photograph.

I was very glad to give the garrison of Vicksburg the terms I did. There was a cartel in existence at that time which required either party to exchange or parole all prisoners captured either at Vicksburg or at a point on the Mississippi river within ten days after capture or as soon thereafter as practicable. This would have used all the transportation we had for a month. The men had behaved so well that I did not want to humiliate them. I believe that consideration for their feelings would make them less dangerous foes during the continuance of hostilities, and better citizens after the war was over.

I am very much obliged to you General for your courtesy in sending me these papers. Very Truly Yours
M. A. Grant

FACSIMILE OF PART OF A LETTER FROM GEN. GRANT TO GEN. MARCUS J. WRIGHT, C. S. A., DATED NEW YORK, NOV. 30, 1864.

to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. Afterward this story was verified. On entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made, the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned or made prisoners on the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to cooperate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor

could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. We had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to 100 yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches were ordered widened, to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank and sand-bags, the latter filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hopes of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are therefore requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the



THE WHITE HOUSE, OR SHIRLEY, AT THE ENTRANCE TO McPHERSON'S SAPS AGAINST THE "THIRD LOUISIANA REDAN," VICKSBURG.
From a war-time sketch.

marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same; they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement.


On the 3d, about 10 o'clock A. M., white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming toward our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for — hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases, and, worst of all, to the jibes of many Northern papers that came to them, saying all their suffering was in vain, Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end, and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith and asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that if Pemberton desired it I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps, at 3 o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose



IN THE SAPS BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE VICKSBURG CRATER, JULY 2, 1863.
From a sketch made at the time.


stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."

At 3 o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was on a hill-side within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made his-

torical by the event. It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root, and limb had disappeared, the fragments being taken as trophies. Since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during a part of the Mexican war. I knew him very well, therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well." General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. His manners and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving some distance away toward the enemy's lines, were in conversation. After awhile Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small-arms and field-artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, I agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by 10 o'clock that night. I had sent word to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton had commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. It was agreed on my parting with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence should cease.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. (Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.) I informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply, and the



HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNION SIGNAL CORPS, VICKSBURG.
From a war-time photograph.



REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLOTILLA ARRIVING BELOW VICKSBURG ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1863—IN THE FOREGROUND GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN GOING IN A YAWL TO THE FLAG-SHIP "BENTON."

substance of the interview, and was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. This was the nearest to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general and almost unanimous judgment of the council, I sent the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A. M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing; and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking-utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded, as soon as possible, to either Aiken's Landing below Dutch Gap, on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate Commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender, there would have been over thirty-odd thousand men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi; thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's—all at very great ex-

pense. At Aiken's they would have to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At 10 o'clock A. M. to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight; my reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition

for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as "Johnnies"; all Union troops as "Yanks." Often "Johnny" would call, "Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there." Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them"; or, "We are holding you as prisoners of war and while you are feeding yourselves." The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the 4th. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made, and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the 4th, in speaking of the "Yankee" boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking rabbit was, "First catch your rabbit." The paper at this time, and for some time previous, was printed


on the plain side of wall paper. The last was issued on the 4th, and announced that we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the 3d for the twofold purpose; first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday,—the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence. Holding out for better terms, as he did, he defeated his aim in the latter particular.

On the 4th, at the appointed hour, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their works, and formed line in front, stacked arms, and marched back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.

Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in, and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly toward the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in *starving out*. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report: "If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th of July, into the stronghold of the great



REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLOTILLA PASSING THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES, NIGHT OF APRIL 16, 1863, THE FLAG-SHIP "BENTON" LEADING, FOLLOWED BY THE "LOUISVILLE," "LAFAYETTE," "GENERAL PRICE," "MOUND CITY," "PITTSBURG," "CARONDELET," AND "TUSCUMBIA"; AND THE TRANSPORTS "HENRY CLAY," "FOREST QUEEN," AND "SILVER WAVE." (FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.)

river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock A. M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would take 24 hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the 4th. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out some time. My recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 3d, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman, and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State, and destroy his army if he could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living underground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay, of great tenacity. Where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left, and stand as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city, night and day, without intermission. . . .

NARRATIVE NOTE.

FROM DONELSON AND NEW ORLEANS TO VICKSBURG—NAVAL OPERATIONS.


On the 9th of May, 1862, Commodore Foote (see page 36) was relieved from the command of the Western Flotilla by Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis. On the 25th Charles Ellet's rams joined the fleet, and the combined forces bombarded Fort Pillow above Memphis, which the enemy abandoned June 4. Memphis fell June 6, after a battle between Davis's and Ellet's fleets on one side and Captain J. E. Montgomery's River Defense Fleet on the other. After the capture of Memphis, Davis sent an expedition up White River, and a combined land and naval attack on June 17 drove the enemy from the bluffs at St. Charles. During the fight a Confederate shell exploded the boilers of the ironclad *Mound City*.

Meanwhile, Farragut's fleet, operating on the lower Mississippi, passed the batteries at Vicksburg, June 26 to

28, and opened communication with Davis by means of Colonel Alfred W. Ellet's ram fleet, which met Farragut's vessels above Vicksburg. Davis reached Vicksburg July 1st. Farragut's fleet dropped down below Vicksburg on the night of the 15th, and Davis retired up the river to Helena. In October Davis was succeeded by David D. Porter, as acting rear-admiral. In November a fleet of gun-boats under Captain Henry Walke entered the Yazoo and cleared it of torpedoes and other obstructions to prepare for Sherman's operations at Chickasaw Bluffs. Porter led the fleet in person while the vessels engaged the batteries during Sherman's attack, and also in the attack on Arkansas Post, January 11, 1863. During the winter his gun-boats operated in the Yazoo, and the ram fleet under young Ellet performed brilliant

After Grant invested Vicksburg on the east, Porter's upper fleet cleared the Yazoo River of obstructions and destroyed the Confederate navy-yard at Yazoo City, together with unfinished vessels, stores, etc., effectually guarding Grant's right flank.

During Grant's assault May 22, the lower fleet bombarded the hill and water batteries, and throughout the



THE "BLACKHAWK," ADMIRAL PORTER'S FLAG-SHIP, VICKSBURG, 1863.

siege the mortar-boats shelled the city and the batteries on the heights. At times the gun-boats joined in the bombardment, notably on May 27, when the *Cincinnati* was sunk by fire from Fort Hill, and June 20. The navy threw 16,000 shells into the enemy's lines. Siege-guns, landed from the gun-boats and placed in position in rear of Vicksburg, were manned by naval crews under command of Lieutenants T. O. Selfridge and J. G. Walker.

INCIDENTS OF THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG FROM THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.

BY COLONEL S. H. LOCKETT, C. S. A.
Chief engineer of the defenses.

. . . On the 25th the Federal dead and some of their wounded in the fight of the 22d were still in our

front and close to our lines. The dead had become offensive, and the living were suffering fearful agonies. General Pemberton, therefore, under a flag of truce, sent a note to General Grant proposing a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours, so that the dead and dying men might receive proper attention. This was acceded to by General Grant, and from six o'clock until nearly dark both parties were engaged in performing funeral rites and deeds of mercy to the dead and wounded Federal soldiers. On this occasion I met General Sherman for the first time. Naturally, the officers of both armies took advantage of the truce to use their eyes to the best possible advantage. I was on the Jackson road redan, which had been terribly pounded and was the object of constant attention from a battery of heavy guns in its immediate front. The Federals were running toward it in a zigzag approach, and were already in uncomfortable proximity to it. While standing on the parapet of this work a Federal orderly came up to me and said that General Sherman wished to speak to me. Following the orderly, I reached a group of officers standing some two hundred yards in front of our line. One of these came forward, introduced himself as General Sherman, and said: "I saw that you were an officer by your insignia of rank, and have asked you to meet me, to put into your hands some letters intrusted to me by Northern friends of some of your officers and men. I thought this would be a good opportunity to deliver this mail before it got too old." To this I replied: "Yes, General, it would have been very old, indeed, if you had kept it until you brought it into Vicksburg yourself." "So you think, then," said the general, "I am a very slow mail route." "Well, rather," was the reply, "when you have to travel by regular approaches, parallels, and zigzags." "Yes," he said, "that is a slow way of getting into a place, but it is a very sure way, and I was determined to deliver those letters sooner or later."

The general then invited me to take a seat with him on an old log near by, and thus the rest of the time of the truce was spent in pleasant conversation. In the course of it the general remarked: "You have an admirable position for defense here, and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground." "Yes, General," I replied, "but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations, and your engineers have not been slow to discover it." To this, General Sherman assented. Intentionally or not, his civility certainly prevented me from seeing many other points in our front that I as chief engineer was very anxious to examine.

The truce ended, the sharp-shooters immediately began their work and kept it up until darkness prevented accuracy of aim. Then the pickets of the two armies were posted in front of their respective lines, so near to each other that they whiled away the long hours of the night-watch with social chat. Within our lines the pick and shovel were the weapons of defense until the next morning.

On the night of the 26th, while we were trying to place an obstruction across the swamp between our right and the river, our working party and its support had a sharp engagement with a detachment of Federals who came to see what we were doing. We captured one hundred of our inquisi-

tive friends, and retired without putting in the obstruction. At other parts of the line the work of making traverses, changing guns to more available points, making covered ways along the line and to the rear, and repairing damages, went on as vigorously as our means would allow.

The events of the 27th of May were varied by an attack on our river batteries by the fleet. The *Cincinnati* was badly crippled, and before reaching her former moorings she sank in water not deep enough to cover her deck. She was still within range of our guns, so that the efforts made by the Federals to dismantle her and remove her armament were effectually prevented.


By this time the Federal commander was evidently convinced that Vicksburg had to be taken by regular siege operations. By the 4th of June the Federals had advanced their parallels within 150 yards of our line. From them they commenced several double saps against our most salient works—the Jackson road redan, the Graveyard road redan, the Third Louisiana redan, on the left of the Jackson road, and the lunette on the right of the Baldwin's Ferry road. In each of these the engineer in charge was ordered to place thundering barrels and loaded shells with short-time fuses, as preparations for meeting assaults. The stockade redan and the stockade on its left, which had been constructed across a low place in our line, had by this time been nearly knocked to

pieces by the enemy's artillery. A new line was therefore made to take its place when it should be no longer tenable. So, too, retrenchments, or inner lines, were ordered at all points where breaches seemed imminent or the enemy more than ordinarily near. These retrenchments served us excellently before the siege was terminated.

By the 8th of June, in spite of all efforts to prevent them, the enemy's sap-rollers had approached within sixty feet or two of our works. A private soldier suggested a novel expedient by which we succeeded in destroying the rollers. He took a piece of port-fire, stuffed it with cotton saturated with turpentine, and fired it from an old-fashioned large-bore musket into the roller, and thus set it on fire. Thus the enemy's sappers were exposed and forced to leave their sap and begin a new one some distance back. After this they kept their sap-rollers wet, forcing us to other expedients.* Our next effort was counter-mining. From the ditches of all the threatened works counter-mines were started on the night of the 13th of June. The Third Louisiana redan was located on a very narrow ridge and had no ditch. The counter-mines for it were therefore started from within by first sinking a vertical shaft, with the intention of working out by an inclined gallery under the enemy's sap. Before this work was completed the Federal sappers succeeded in getting under the salient of the redan, and on the 25th they exploded a small mine, but the charge was too small to do much damage. Nevertheless it tore off the vortex of the redan, and made what the Federals thought was a practicable breach. Into it they poured in strong force as soon as the explosion had expended itself. But they were met by a deadly volley from our men posted behind the retrenchment prepared for this emergency, and after heavy loss were compelled to retire. Six of our counter-miners were buried by this explosion.

On the same day we exploded two of our counter-mines and completely destroyed the enemy's sap-rollers, filled up their saps, and forced them to abandon a parallel very close to our line. Two days later we exploded another mine prematurely, without injury to the enemy, as they had not approached as near our works as we supposed. It was very difficult to determine distances underground, where we could hear the enemy's sappers picking, picking, so very distinctly that it hardly seemed possible for them to be more than a few feet distant, when in reality they were many yards away.


*I think this may be the origin of General Grant's notion that we had explosive bullets. I certainly never heard of anything of the sort, and most surely would have made some use of them if we had had them in circumventing the Federal engineers.—S. H. L. [See statement of General Grant, p. 213.]



FIRST CONFERENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND PEMBERTON, JULY 3, 1863.

From a sketch made at the time.

NOTE.—Grant and Pemberton met near the tree and went aside to the earthwork, where they sat in conference. To their right is a group of four, including General John S. Bowen, C. S. A., General A. J. Smith, General James B. McPherson, and Colonel L. M. Montgomery. Under the tree are Chief-of-Staff John A. Rawlins, Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, and Theodore R. Davis, special artist, who made the above and many other sketches of the Vicksburg siege, in this work.



GENERAL GRANT.

MASTER FRED. D. GRANT, CHARLES A. DANA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.

UNION HEADQUARTERS, JULY 3. GENERAL GRANT RECEIVING GENERAL PEMBERTON'S MESSAGE. From a sketch made at the time.

NOTE.—In his "Personal Memoirs" (C. L. Webster & Co.) General Grant says: "On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board of one of the gun-boats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill—called the battle of Port Gibson—found his way to where I was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal. He therefore foraged around the best he could until he reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and through a

portion of the siege. He was in the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. He looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years."

On the 29th of June the enemy had succeeded in getting close up to the parapet of the Third Louisiana redan. We rolled some of their unexploded 13-inch shells down upon them and annoyed them so much as to force them to stop operations. At night they protected themselves against this method of attack by erecting a screen in front of their sap.


This screen was made of heavy timbers, which even the shells could not move. I finally determined to try the effect of a barrel of powder. One containing 125 pounds was obtained, a time-fuse set to fifteen seconds was placed in the bungle-hole, was touched off by myself with a live coal, and the barrel was rolled over the parapet by two of our sappers. The barrel went true to its destination and exploded with terrific force. Timbers, gabions, and fascines were hurled into the air in all directions, and the sappers once more were compelled to retire. They renewed their operations, however, at night, and in a few days succeeded in establishing their mine under the redan, which they exploded at 1:30 o'clock P. M. on the 1st of July. The charge was enormous—one and a quarter tons, as I subsequently learned from the Federal engineer. The crater made was about twenty feet deep and fifty feet in diameter. The redan was virtually destroyed, and the explosive effect extended back

far enough to make a breach of nearly twenty feet width in the retrenchment across the gorge of the work. We expected an assault, but previous experience had made the enemy cautious. Instead, they opened upon the work a most terrific fire from everything that could be brought to bear upon it. Only a few minutes before the explosion I had been down in our counter-mine and had left seven men there, only one of whom was ever seen again; he, a negro, was blown over into the Federal lines, but not seriously hurt. The next thing for us to do was to stop the breach in our retrenchment. This we first tried to accomplish by heaving dirt into the breach with shovels from the two sides, but the earth was swept away by the storm of mis-




WOODEN COEHORN ON GRANT'S LINES.

From a sketch.



ARRIVAL OF GENERAL GRANT AT GENERAL PEMBERTON'S VICKSBURG HOUSE, JULY 4, 1863.
From a sketch made at the time.



LOGAN'S DIVISION ENTERING VICKSBURG BY THE JACKSON ROAD, JULY 4, 1863.
From a sketch made at the time.

siles faster than it could be placed in position. We then tried sand-bags, but they, too, were torn to shreds and scattered. Finally I sent for some tent flies and wagon covers, and with these great rolls of earth was prepared under cover and pushed into place, until at last we had something between us and the deadly hail of shot and shell and Minié balls. Playing into that narrow breach for nearly six hours were 2 9-inch Dahlgren guns, a battery of large Parrotts, one or more batteries of field-guns, a Coehorn mortar, and the deadliest fire of musketry ever witnessed by any of us there present. We stopped the breach, but lost in killed and wounded nearly one hundred men by the explosion and the subsequent fusillade. This was really the last stirring incident of the siege. On the 2d of July we exploded one of our mines somewhat prematurely, and we had ready for explosion 11 others, containing from 100 to 125 pounds of powder, and extending at a depth of 6 to 9 feet for a distance of from 18 to 20 feet in front of our works. The fuses were set and everything was primed and ready for the approach of the Federal sappers, but on the 3d of July the flag of truce stopped all operations on both sides, and the efficiency of our preparations was not put to the test.

The Federal engineers had similar preparations made for our destruction at several points. Their men had gradually closed up to our lines, so that at some portions, for a hundred yards or more, the thickness of our parapet was all that separated us. Fighting by hand-grenades was all that was possible at such close quarters. As the Federals had the hand-grenades and we had none, we obtained our supply by using such of theirs as failed to explode, or by catching them as they came over the parapet and hurling them back.

The causes that led to the capitulation are well known. We had been from the beginning short of ammunition, and continued so throughout in

spite of the daring exploits of Lamar Fontaine, Captain E. J. Sanders, and Courier Walker, who floated down the river on logs and brought, respectively, 18,000, 20,000, and 200,000 caps. We were short of provisions, so that our men had been on quarter rations for days before the close of the siege; had eaten mule meat, and rats, and young shoots of cane, with a relish of epicures dining on the finest delicacies of the table. We were so short-handed that no man within the lines had ever been off duty more than a small part of each day; and in response to inquiries of the lieutenant-general

commanding, every general officer and colonel had reported his men as physically exhausted and unfit for any duty but simply standing in the trenches and firing. Our lines were badly battered, many of our guns were dismantled, and the Federal forces were within less than a minute of our defenses, so that a single dash could have precipitated them upon us in overwhelming numbers. All of these facts were brought out in the council of war on the night of the 2d of July. After that General Pemberton said he had lost all hopes of being relieved by General Johnston; he had considered every possible plan of relieving ourselves, and to

his mind there were but two alternatives—either to surrender while we still had ammunition enough left to give us the right to demand terms, or to sell our lives as dearly as possible in what he knew must be a hopeless effort to cut our way through the Federal lines. He then asked each officer present to give his vote on the question, *surrender or not?* Beginning with the junior officer present, all voted to surrender but two,—Brigadier-General S. D. Lee and Brigadier-General Baldwin,—and these had no reasons to offer. After all had voted, General Pemberton said: "Well, gentlemen, I

have heard your votes, and I agree with your almost unanimous decision, though my own preference would be to put myself at the head of my troops and make a desperate effort to cut our way through the enemy. That is my only hope of saving myself from shame and disgrace. Far better would it be for me to die at the head of my army, even in a vain effort to force the enemy's lines, than to surrender it and live and meet the obloquy which I know will be heaped upon me. But my duty is to sacrifice myself to save the army which has so nobly done its duty to defend Vicksburg. I therefore concur with you, and shall offer to surrender this army on

the 4th of July." Some objection was made to the day, but General Pemberton said: "I am a Northern man; I know my people; I know their peculiar weaknesses and their national vanity; I know we can get better terms from them on the 4th of July than any other day of the year. We must sacrifice our pride to these considerations." And thus the surrender was brought about.

During the negotiations we noticed that General Grant and Admiral Porter were communicating with each other by signals from a tall tower on land and a mast-head on Porter's ship. Our signal-service men had long before worked out the Federal code on the principle of Poe's "Gold Bug," and translated the messages as soon as sent. We knew that General Grant was anxious to take us all as prisoners to the Northern prison-pens. We also knew that Porter said that he did not have sufficient transportation to carry us, and that in his judgment it would be far better to parole us and use the fleet in sending the Federal troops to Port Hudson and other points where they were needed. This helped to make General Pemberton more bold and persistent in his demands, and finally enabled him to obtain virtually the terms of his original proposition.

A few minutes after the Federal soldiers marched in, the soldiers of the two armies were fraternizing and swapping yarns over the incidents of the long siege. One Federal soldier seeing me on my little white pony, which I had ridden every day to and from and along the lines, sang out as he passed: "See here, Mister,—you man on the little white horse! Danged if you ain't the hardest feller to hit I ever saw; I've shot at you more 'n a hundred times!"

General Grant says there was no cheering by the Federal troops. My recollection is that on our right a hearty cheer was given by one Federal division "for the gallant defenders of Vicksburg!"



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, C. S. A.
Commanding the besieged garrison of Vicksburg.



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. BRANNAN,
U. S. A.
From a photograph taken in May, 1865.



CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE IN THE CHICKAMAUGA WOODS.



MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES A. GARFIELD,
U. S. V.
From a war-time photograph.

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

NARRATIVE NOTE.

After the battle of Murfreesboro' (Stone's River), December 31, 1862-January 2, 1863, Rosecrans's army remained at Murfreesboro', facing Bragg's fortified camps at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. In June Rosecrans marched around Bragg's right flank, and compelled him to retreat to Chattanooga. After the surrender of Vicksburg and the battle of Gettysburg (July, 1863), Bragg was reinforced from Mississippi, and Longstreet was ordered to join him from Virginia.

Early in September Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee on the right (west) of Chattanooga, and advanced southward into Georgia. Bragg also marched southward, abandoning Chattanooga, which Rosecrans occupied,

placing his army in position to cover its southern approaches. Bragg countermarched his army, and attacked Rosecrans on the 19th. The brunt of the fighting fell upon the Union left wing under Thomas, which Bragg attempted to crush in order to gain the Rossville road, the gateway to Chattanooga. The attack failed, but was resumed on the 20th. Polk commanded the Confederate right against Thomas, and Longstreet, who had reached the field during the night, commanded the left. Rosecrans strengthened Thomas by withdrawing troops from McCook's corps on the right.

General Hill's narrative is mainly a description of the decisive attack upon Rosecrans's right center and right.

found it necessary to detail Hardee to defend Mississippi and Alabama. His corps is without a commander. I wish you to command it." "I cannot

do that," I replied, "as General Stewart ranks me." "I can cure that," answered Mr. Davis, "by making you a lieutenant-general. Your papers will be ready to-morrow. When can you start?" "In twenty-four hours," was the reply. . . .

[An ineffectual attack by Polk upon Thomas opened the battle of the second day. General Hill proceeds:]

At 11 A. M. Stewart's division advanced under an immediate order from Bragg. His three brigades under Brown, Clayton, and Bate advanced with Wood of Cleburne's division, and, as General Stewart says, "pressed on past the corn-field in front of the burnt house, two or three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments. . . . Here they met a fresh artillery fire on front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, and had to retire."

This was the celebrated attack upon Reynolds and Brannan which led directly to the Federal disaster. In the mean time our right was preparing to renew the attack. I proposed to the wing commander, Polk, to make a second advance, provided fresh troops were sent forward, requesting that the gap in Breckinridge's left, made by the withdrawal of Helm, should be filled by another brigade. General J. K. Jackson's was sent for that purpose, but unfortunately took its position too far in rear to engage the attention of the enemy in front, and every advance on our right during the remainder of the day was met with flank and cross fire from that quarter. Gist's brigade and Liddell's division of Walker's corps reported to me. Gist immediately attacked with great vigor the log-works which had repulsed Helm so disastrously, and he in turn was driven back. Liddell might have made as great an impression by moving on the Chattanooga road as Breckinridge had done, but his strong brigade (Walthall's) was detached, and he advanced with Govan's alone, seized the road for the second time that day, and was moving behind the breastworks, when, a column of the enemy appearing on his flank and rear, he was compelled to retreat.

This was simultaneous with the advance of Stewart. The heavy pressure on Thomas caused Rosecrans to support him by sending the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve and Brannan's reserve brigade. In the course of these changes, an order to Wood, which Rosecrans claims was misinterpreted, led to a gap being left into which Longstreet stepped with the eight brigades (Bushrod Johnson's original brigade and McNair's, Gregg's, Kershaw's, Law's, Humphrey's, Benning's, and Robertson's) which he had arranged in three lines to constitute his grand column of attack. Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were caught in front and flank and driven from the field. Disregarding the order of the day, Longstreet now gave the order to wheel to the right instead of the left, and thus take in reverse the strong position of the enemy. Five of McCook's brigades were speedily driven off the field. He es-

THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.


THE GREAT ATTACK AT CHICKAMAUGA.

BY DANIEL H. HILL, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.
Commander of a corps at the battle of Chickamauga.


ON the 13th of July, 1863, while in charge of the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg and the department of North Carolina, I received an unexpected order to go West. I was seated in a yard of a house in the suburbs of Richmond (the house belonging to Mr. Poe, a relative of the poet), when President Davis, dressed in a plain suit of gray and attended by a small escort in brilliant uniform, galloped up and said: "Rosecrans" is about to advance upon Bragg; I have

*At the beginning of the Civil War I was asked the question, "Who of the Federal officers are most to be feared?" I replied: "Sherman, Rosecrans, and McClellan. Sherman has genius and daring, and is full of resources. Rosecrans has fine practical sense, and is of a tough, tenacious fiber. McClellan is a man of talents, and his delight has always been in the study of military history and the art and science of war." Grant was not once thought of. The light of subsequent events thrown upon the careers of these three great soldiers has not changed my estimate of them; but I acquiesce in the verdict which has given greater renown to some of their comrades. . . .

I fought against McClellan from Yorktown to Sharpsburg (Antietam), I encountered Rosecrans at Chickamauga, and I surrendered to Sherman at Greensboro', N. C.—each of the three commanding an army.—D. H. H.



MAP OF THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.



LEE AND GORDON'S MILLS ON THE CHICKAMAUGA.

timates their loss at forty per cent. Certainly that flank march was a bloody one. I have never seen the Federal dead lie so thickly on the ground, save in front of the sunken wall at Fredericksburg.


But that indomitable Virginia soldier, George H. Thomas, was there, and was destined to save the Union army from total rout and ruin, by confronting with invincible pluck the forces of his friend and captain in the Mexican war. Thomas had ridden to his right to hurry up reinforcements, when he discovered a line advancing, which he thought at first was the expected succor from Sheridan, but he soon heard that it was a rebel column marching upon him. He chose a strong position on a spur of Missionary Ridge, running east and west, placed upon it Brannan's division with portions of two brigades of Negley's; Wood's division (Crittenden's) was placed on Brannan's left. These troops, with such as could be rallied from the two broken corps, were all he had to confront the forces of Longstreet, until Steedman's division of Granger corps came to his relief about 3 p. m. Well and nobly did Thomas and his gallant troops hold their own against foes flushed with past victory and confident of future success. His new line was nearly at right angles with the line of log-works on the west side of the Rossville road, his right being an almost impregnable wall-like hill, his left nearly an inclosed fortification. Our only hope of success was to get in his rear by moving far to our right, which overlapped the Federal left.

Bushrod Johnson's three brigades in Longstreet's center were the first to fill the gap left by Wood's withdrawal from the Federal right; but the other five brigades under Hindman and Kershaw moved promptly into line as soon as space could be found for them, wheeled to the right, and engaged in the murderous flank attack. On they rushed, shouting, yelling, running over batteries, capturing trains,

taking prisoners, seizing the headquarters of the Federal commander, at the Widow Glenn's, until they found themselves facing the new Federal line on Snodgrass Hill. Hindman had advanced a little later than the center, and had met great and immediate success. The brigades of Deas and Manigault charged the breastworks at double-quick, rushed over them, drove Laiboldt's Federal brigade of Sheridan's division off the field down the Rossville road; then General Patton Anderson's brigade of Hindman, having come into line, attacked and beat back the forces of Davis, Sheridan, and Wilder, in their front, killed the hero and poet General Lytle, took 1100 prisoners, 27 pieces of artillery, commissary and ordnance trains, etc. Finding no more resistance on his front and left, Hindman wheeled to the right to assist the forces of the center. The divisions of Stewart, Hood, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman came together in front of the new stronghold of the Federals.

It was now 2:30 p. m. Longstreet, with his staff, was lunching on sweet-potatoes. A message came just then that the commanding general wished to see him. He found Bragg in rear of his lines, told him of the steady and satisfactory progress of the battle, that sixty pieces of artillery had been reported captured (though probably the number was overestimated), that many prisoners and stores had been taken, and that all was going well. He then asked for additional troops to hold the ground gained, while he pursued the two broken corps down the Dry Valley road and cut off the retreat of Thomas. Bragg replied that there was no more fight in the troops of Polk's wing, that he could give Longstreet no reinforcements, and that his headquarters would be at Reed's Bridge. He seems not to have known that Cheatham's division and part of Liddell's had not been in action that day.

Some of the severest fighting had yet to be done



THE SNODGRASS FARM-HOUSE.

General Thomas's headquarters on the second day were in the field this side of the house. The hills called the "Horse-shoe," made famous by the defense of Brannan and Steedman, lie on the opposite side of the house.

after 3 p. m. It probably never happened before for a great battle to be fought to its bloody conclusion with the commanders of each side away from the field of conflict. But the Federals were in the hands of the indomitable Thomas, and the Confederates were under their two heroic wing commanders, Longstreet and Polk. In the lull of the strife I went with a staff-officer to examine the ground on our left. One of Helm's wounded men had been overlooked, and was lying alone in the woods, his head partly supported by a tree. He was shockingly injured.*


Hindman and Bushrod Johnson organized a column of attack upon the front and rear of the stronghold of Thomas. It consisted of the brigades of Deas, Manigault, Gregg, Patton, Anderson, and McNair. Three of the brigades, Johnson says, had each but five hundred men, and the other two were not strong. Deas was on the north side of the gorge through which the Crawfish road crosses, Manigault across the gorge and south, on the crest parallel to the Snodgrass Hill, where Thomas was. The other three brigades extended along the crest with their faces north, while the first two faced east. Kershaw, with his own and Humphreys's brigade, was on the right of Anderson, and was to coöperate in the movement. It began at 3:30 p. m. A terrific contest ensued. The bayonet was used,

*He belonged to Von Zinken's regiment, of New Orleans, composed of French, Germans, and Irish. I said to him: "My poor fellow, you are badly hurt. What regiment do you belong to?" He replied: "The Fifth Confederate, and a damned good regiment it is." The answer, though almost ludicrous, touched me as illustrating the *esprit de corps* of the soldier — his pride in and his affection for his command. Colonel Von Zinken told me afterward that one of his desperately wounded Irishmen cried out to his comrades, "Charge them, boys; they have cha-ase (cheese) in their haversacks." Poor Pat, he has fought courageously in every land in quarrels not his own.—D. H. H.

and men were killed and wounded with clubbed muskets. A little after 4, the enemy was reinforced, and advanced, but was repulsed by Anderson and Kershaw.

General Bushrod Johnson claims that his men were surely, if slowly, gaining ground at all points, which must have made untenable the stronghold of Thomas. Relief was, however, to come to our men, so hotly engaged on the left, by the advance of the right. At 3 p. m. Forrest reported to me that a strong column was approaching from Rossville, which he was delaying all he could. From prisoners we soon learned that it was Granger's corps. We were apprehensive that a flank attack, by fresh troops, upon our exhausted and shattered ranks might prove fatal. Major-General Walker strongly advised falling back to the position of Cleburne, but to this I would not consent, believing that it would invite attack, as we were in full view. Cheatham's fine division was sent to my assistance by the wing commander. . . .

Longstreet was determined to send Preston with his division of three brigades under Gracie, Trigg, and Kelly, aided by Robertson's brigade of Hood's division, to carry the heights — the main point of defense. His troops were of the best material and had been in reserve all day; but brave, fresh, and strong as they were, it was with them alternate advance and retreat, until success was assured by a renewal of the fight on the right. At 3:30 p. m. General Polk sent an order to me to assume command of the attacking forces on the right and renew the assault. Owing to a delay in the adjustment of our lines, the advance did not begin until 4 o'clock. The men sprang to their arms with the utmost alacrity, though they had not heard of Longstreet's success, and they showed by their cheerfulness that there was plenty of "fight in them." Cleburne ran forward his batteries, some by hand,



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.
Commanding the Fourteenth Army Corps at Chickamauga.

to within three hundred yards of the enemy's breastworks, pushed forward his infantry, and carried them. General J. K. Jackson, of Cheatham's division, had a bloody struggle with the fortifications in his front, but had entered them when Cheatham with two more of his brigades, Maney's and Wright's, came up. Breckinridge and Walker met with but little opposition until the Chattanooga road was passed, when their right was unable to overcome the forces covering the enemy's retreat. As we passed into the woods west of the road, it was reported to me that a line was advancing at right angles to ours. I rode to the left to

ascertain whether they were foes or friends, and soon recognized General Buckner. The cheers that went up when the two wings met were such as I had never heard before, and shall never hear again.

Preston gained the heights a half hour later, capturing 1000 prisoners and 4500 stand of arms. But neither right nor left is entitled to the laurels of a complete triumph. It was the combined attack which, by weakening the enthusiasm of the brave warriors who had stood on the defense so long and so obstinately, won the day.

Thomas had received orders after Granger's arri-

val to retreat to Rossville, but, stout soldier as he was, he resolved to hold his ground until nightfall. An hour more of daylight would have insured his capture. Thomas had under him all the Federal army, except the six brigades which had been driven off by the left wing.

Whatever blunders each of us in authority committed before the battles of the 19th and 20th, and during their progress, the great blunder of all was that of not pursuing the enemy on the 21st. The day was spent in burying the dead and gathering up captured stores. Forrest, with his usual promptness, was early in the saddle, and saw that the retreat was a rout. Disorganized masses of men were hurrying to the rear; batteries of artillery were inextricably mixed with trains of wagons; disorder and confusion pervaded the broken ranks struggling to get on. Forrest sent back word to Bragg that "every hour was worth a thousand men." But the commander-in-chief did not know of the victory until the morning of the 21st, and then he did not order a pursuit. Rosecrans spent the day and the night of the 21st in hurrying his trains out of town. A breathing-space was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga—the objective point of the campaign—was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the *elan* of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That "barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy.

THE UNION SIDE.

RECEIVING THE ATTACK.

BY EMERSON OPDYCKE, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

Colonel of the 125th Ohio at the battle of Chickamauga.

... Rosecrans slowly concentrated his corps on the north bank of the Chickamauga River, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, twelve miles south of Chattanooga. Bragg decided to move down the valley up which he had retired because, first, of all the routes open to him that one was least obstructed; and, secondly, because it would continue his army near the railway of his supplies, which was also bringing him Longstreet.

Rosecrans did not get his corps united and well in position, before the enemy, on the 19th, began the battle of Chickamauga.

The country in which the next two days' operations took place lies between the river and Missionary Ridge, and was covered by woods of varying density, broken here and there by cleared fields. The Chickamauga River, winding slowly through



BRIG.-GENERAL W. H. LYTLE, U. S. V.
Commanding the First Brigade, Sheridan's division, killed September 20, 1863.

the forest of the region, flows into the Tennessee eight miles above Chattanooga. Bragg's aim was to turn our left and gain the road into Chattanooga, now indispensable to the existence of our army. Thomas commanded our left; and as Bragg sent division after division against that wing, Rosecrans sent successive divisions to Thomas. The fighting was close and stubborn; batteries were taken and retaken till the day closed, without material advantage to either side. It was clear, however, that we were outnumbered; for, while we had put nearly every regiment into the action, the enemy, meeting us with equal numbers in line of battle, still had heavy reserves.

In the night both commanders prepared for the decisive conflict which all felt must come on the 20th. Still covering the Chattanooga road, Rosecrans placed his army in a somewhat better position, both flanks well refused. From left to right his divisions were: Baird's, R. W. Johnson's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, Brannan's, Negley's, Davis's, Sheridan's; Wood's and Van Cleve's were in reserve; and three brigades of Granger's corps were near Rossville, four miles away. Thomas commanded six divisions at the left, McCook two at the right, and Crittenden the two in reserve. Thomas covered his front with a slight barricade of rails and old logs found in the woods, and so greatly aided his men.

Early in the morning Thomas discovered, and reported to Rosecrans, that another division was needed to maintain our extreme left against the enemy's longer line. Rosecrans, therefore, brought Wood from reserve to relieve Negley, and ordered Negley at once to report his division to Thomas; and Thomas was informed that Negley would immediately join him at the left. But Negley, disappearing from the line, drifted away from the field to Rossville. Two of his brigades reached the left, but so far apart, and so ill-timed, as to be of little value. It is important to remember Negley's conduct, because from it came the misapprehensions that were soon to result in disaster to our right wing.

The Confederate plan was to turn and envelop our left, and then to advance upon our divisions in succession, and involve the whole in one common ruin. Their right wing was commanded by Polk, and their left by Longstreet.

Polk was ordered to begin the battle at day-

break, but the first shots were not heard before 8:30; and, in an hour, the action at the left became furious. Polk's right division began to envelop our left and to appear upon our rear; but Thomas hurried some reserves against it and drove it away in disorder. Having been able, in the absence of Negley's division, to find the way to our left and rear, the enemy would naturally reappear there with decisive numbers. Thomas, therefore, knowing nothing of Negley's conduct, and wishing to add only a division to his left, sent again and again for the promised reinforcements. The attack soon extended heavily to Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds; and, by 10:30, lightly to Brannan. Naturally supposing that Negley had already reached Thomas, Rosecrans inferred, from the requests of Thomas and from other indications, that Bragg was moving his left wing to the extreme right of the Confederate line of battle. The conflict had been raging against Thomas for two hours, while Wood, Davis, and Sheridan were untouched; and, not suspecting that Longstreet (a reconnaissance of ten minutes would have developed it) was already formed for attack and about to advance in

full force against our right wing, Rosecrans, in the short space of fifteen minutes,—10:30 to 10:45,—ordered to his left Van Cleve, from the reserve, and Sheridan from the extreme right; and, by the blunder of an aide in wording an order, sent Wood out of line to "close up on Reynolds and support him as soon as possible," while McCook was to move Davis by the left flank into the position vacated by Wood. These disconnected and fatal movements of Van Cleve, Wood, Sheridan, and Davis were in progress when Longstreet attacked them with six divisions of the Confederate left wing. Disaster was the immediate and inevitable result.

Sheridan's routed division moved back to Rossville. Heroism could not save Davis; his division was overwhelmed, and scattered in fragments that were afterward collected behind Missionary Ridge. Wood's movement uncovered Brannan's right, and, in temporary confusion, that division hurried away to a new position. This exposed Reynolds's right, made it necessary for him to change front to the rear at right angles on his left; but *there* he held firmly to Palmer's right. The rush of disordered troops and

artillery, disintegrating Van Cleve's division, destroyed its further usefulness in this battle.

Rosecrans, seeing this appalling demolition of his right wing, and finding that the enemy had interposed between him and Thomas, hastened around to Rossville. Finding there men of Negley's division, which he had supposed to be with Thomas, Rosecrans thought the day lost, and deemed it his duty to hasten to Chattanooga, there to prepare for the reception and disposition of what *seemed to him* his disordered and defeated army.

Rosecrans and Garfield, his chief-of-staff, separated at Rossville, Rosecrans riding to Chattanooga and Garfield to Thomas at the front. Rosecrans says that he sent Garfield to the front; while Garfield has many times said that he himself insisted upon going, that the sound of the battle proved that Thomas was still

holding the enemy in check. McCook and Crittenden soon joined Rosecrans at Chattanooga; but Thomas remained on the field. Brannan brought his division to a good position, but so far to the right of Reynolds that the space of a division lay open between them. While Wood was moving toward this gap, Longstreet, advancing to complete the work, came within musket-range.

The moment was critical, because if Wood should be unable to occupy and hold the gap, Longstreet would pass through, permanently cut off Brannan, again turn, and then overwhelm Reynolds, and attack the rear of Palmer, Johnson, and Baird, who were still confronted by Polk. Wood coolly changed front under fire, so as to face south instead of east, and caused one of his brigades to charge with fixed bayonets. The audacity of the charge probably made the enemy believe that there was force enough near to sustain it, for they soon bolted, and then fled out of range just before our bayonets reached their ranks. The needed moments were snatched from the enemy, and Wood brought his division into the gap between Reynolds and Brannan.

Except some fragments from the broken divisions, our line was now composed of Baird's, Johnson's, Palmer's, Reynolds's, Wood's, and Brannan's divisions, naming them from left to right. In front stood the whole army of the enemy, eager to fall upon us with the energy that comes from great success and greater hopes. But close behind our line rode a general whose judgment never erred, whose calm, invincible will never bent; and around him thirty thousand soldiers resolved to exhaust the last round of ammunition, and then to hold their ground with their bayonets. Soldiers thus inspired and commanded, are more easily killed than defeated.


For five long hours the shocks and carnage were

as close and deadly as men could make them. Thomas often came within speaking distance of his men, and wherever the energy of the attack most endangered our line, he strengthened it with cannon and regiments drawn from points in less peril; and when the soldiers asked for more ammunition Thomas said: "Use your bayonets." At about 3:30 in the afternoon I saw General Thomas looking in the direction of Chattanooga, watching with anxious interest a column of dust rising in the air. Our suspense was relieved when Granger and Steedman emerged from the dust, and Garfield dashed up to Thomas.

To prevent a turning movement on the road from Ringgold, through Rossville to Chattanooga, Granger, with three brigades, had been stationed on the Ringgold road; and, by a sound, soldierly judgment, leaving one brigade to do the work assigned to three, brought two brigades to the field. Thomas himself was then only a little way down the rear slope of the low ridge on which Wood's division was fighting, with every man in the line, and with no reserves. We were hard pressed, and many muskets became so hot that loading was difficult; but Thomas sent up two cannon with the words: "The position must be held." The reply was: "Tell General Thomas that we will hold the position or go to heaven from it."


At about 4 o'clock Longstreet drew back and asked for reinforcements, but was answered that the right wing was already so shattered that it could not aid him. He then brought forward his reserves and re-formed his lines; and extending beyond our right, advanced in a final attack.

Thomas ordered Granger's reinforcements to the right of Brannan, where the enemy had already begun to appear. The conflict there, and on the divisions of Brannan and Wood, was soon at its




HOUSE OF MR. J. M. LEE, CRAWFISH SPRINGS, ROSECRANS'S HEADQUARTERS BEFORE THE BATTLE, AND SITE OF THE UNION FIELD-HOSPITAL FOR THE RIGHT WING.

From a photograph taken in 1884.



GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD, C. S. A.
Commanding a corps at Chickamauga.



CRAWFISH SPRINGS.

fiereest. Our short-range ammunition from the cannon cut great gaps through the enemy's columns, and the steady volleys of musketry, aided by our bayonets, did their remorseless work for about thirty minutes; and then the Confederate left wing, shattered, bleeding, defeated, withdrew from sight. The battle was ended — Thomas had saved the army. . . .

REINFORCING GENERAL THOMAS.

BY J. S. FULLERTON, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

At Chickamauga chief-of-staff to General Gordon Granger.

ON the 19th day of September, 1863, the Reserve Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, General Gordon Granger in command, was distributed over a long stretch of country, its rear at Murfreesboro' and its van on the battlefield of Chickamauga. These troops had been posted to cover the rear and left flank of the army. During September 19th, the first day of the battle, they were engaged in some skirmishing and stood at arms expecting an attack. On the evening of the 19th every indication pointed to a renewal of the battle early the next day. The night was cold for that time of the year. Tell-tale fires were prohibited. The men slept on their arms. All was quiet save in the field-hospitals in the rear. A bright moon lighted up the fields and woods.

Along the greater part of a front of eight miles the ground was strewn with the intermingled dead of friend and foe. The morning of Sunday, the 20th, opened with a cloudless sky, but a fog had come up from the warm water of the Chickamauga and hung over the battlefield until 9 o'clock. A silence of desertion was in the front. This quiet continued till nearly 10 o'clock; then, as the peaceful tones of the church-bells, rolling over the land from the east, reached the meridian of Chickamauga, they were made dissonant by the murderous roar of the artillery of Bishop Polk, who was opening the battle on Thomas's front. Granger, who had been ordered at all hazards to hold fast where he was, listened and grew impatient. Shortly before 10 o'clock, calling my attention to a great column of dust moving from our front toward the point from which came the sound of battle, he said, "They are concentrating over there. That is where we ought to be." The corps flag marked his headquarters in an open field near the Ringgold road. He walked up and down in front of his flag, nervously pulling his beard. Once stopping, he said, "Why the — does Rosecrans keep me here? There is nothing in front of us now. There is the battle!" — pointing in the direction of Thomas. Every moment the sounds of battle grew louder, while the many columns of dust rolling together here mingled with the smoke that hung over the scene.

At 11 o'clock, with Granger, I climbed a high hayrick near by. We sat there for ten minutes listening and watching. Then Granger jumped up, thrust his glass into its case, and exclaimed with an oath: "I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders!"

"And if you go," I replied, "it may bring disaster to the army and you to a court-martial."

"There's nothing in our front now but ragtag, bobtail cavalry," he replied. "Don't you see

Bragg is piling his whole army on Thomas? I am going to his assistance."

We quickly climbed down the rick, and, going to Steedman, Granger ordered him to move his command "over there," pointing toward the place from which came the sounds of battle. Colonel Daniel McCook was directed to hold fast at McAfee Church, where his brigade covered the Ringgold road. Before half-past 11 o'clock Steedman's command was in motion. Granger, with his staff and escort, rode in advance. Steedman, after accompanying them a short distance, rode back to the head of his column.

Thomas was nearly four miles away. The day had now grown very warm, yet the troops marched rapidly over the narrow road, which was covered ankle-deep with dust that rose in suffocating clouds. Completely enveloped in it, the moving column swept along like a desert sandstorm. Two miles from the point of starting, and three-quarters of a mile to the left of the road, the enemy's skirmishers and a section of artillery opened fire on us from an open wood. This force had worked round Thomas's left, and was then partly in his rear. Granger halted to feel them. Soon becoming convinced that it was only a large party of observation, he again started his column and pushed rapidly forward. I was then sent to bring up Colonel McCook's brigade, and put it in position to watch the movements of the enemy, to keep open the Lafayette road, and to cover the open fields between that point and the position held by Thomas. This brigade remained there the rest of the day. Our skirmishers had not gone far when they came upon Thomas's field-hospital, at Cloud's house, then swarming with the enemy. They came from the same body of Forrest's cavalry that had fired on us from the wood. They were quickly driven out, and our men were warmly welcomed with cheers from dying and wounded men.

A little farther on we were met by a staff-officer sent by General Thomas to discover whether we were friends or enemies; he did not know whence friends could be coming, and the enemy appeared to be approaching from all directions. All of this shattered Army of the Cumberland left on the field was with Thomas; but not more than one-fourth of the men of the army who went into battle at the opening were there. Thomas's loss in killed and wounded during the two days had been dreadful. As his men dropped out his line was contracted to half its length. Now its flanks were bent back, conforming to ridges shaped like a horse-shoe.

On the part of Thomas and his men there was no thought but that of fighting. He was a soldier who had never retreated, who had never been defeated. He stood immovable, the "Rock of Chickamauga." Never had soldiers greater love for a commander. He imbued them with his spirit, and their confidence in him was sublime.

To the right of Thomas's line was a gorge, then a high ridge, nearly at right angles thereto, running east and west. Confederates under Kershaw

(McLaws's division of Hood's corps) were passing through the gorge, together with Bushrod Johnson's division, which Longstreet was strengthening with Hindman's division; divisions were forming on this ridge for an assault; to their left the guns of a battery were being unlimbered for an enfilading fire. There was not a man to send against the force on the ridge, none to oppose this impending assault. The enemy saw the approaching colors of the Reserve Corps and hesitated.

At 1 o'clock Granger shook hands with Thomas. Something was said about forming to fight to the right and rear.

"Those men must be driven back," said Granger, pointing to the gorge and ridge. "Can you do it?" asked Thomas.



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER, C. S. A.
Cavalry commander under Bragg at Chickamauga.

"Yes, my men are fresh, and they are just the fellows for that work. They are raw troops, and they don't know any better than to charge up there."

Granger quickly sent Aleshire's battery of 3-inch rifle guns which he brought up to Thomas's left to assist in repelling another assault about to be made on the Kelly farm front. Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades under Steedman were wheeled into position and projected against the enemy in the gorge and on the ridge. With ringing cheers they advanced in two lines by double-quick — over open fields, through weeds waist-high, through a little val-

ley, then up the ridge. The enemy opened on them first with artillery, then with a murderous musketry fire. When well up the ridge the men almost exhausted were halted for breath. They lay on the ground two or three minutes, then came the command, "Forward!" Brave, bluff old Steedman, with a regimental flag in his hand, led the way. On went the lines, firing as they ran and bravely receiving a deadly and continuous fire from the enemy on the summit. The Confederates began to break and in another minute were flying down the southern slope of the ridge. In twenty minutes from the beginning of the charge the ridge had been carried.

Granger's hat had been torn by a fragment of shell; Steedman had been wounded; Whitaker had been wounded, and four of his five staff-officers killed or mortally wounded. Of Steedman's two brigades, numbering 3500, twenty per cent. had been killed and wounded in that twenty minutes; and the end was not yet.

The enemy massed a force to retake the ridge. They came before our men had rested; twice they assaulted and were driven back. During one assault, as the first line came within range of our muskets, it halted, apparently hesitating, when we saw a colonel seize a flag, wave it over his head, and rush forward. The whole line instantly caught his enthusiasm, and with a wild cheer followed, only to be hurled back again. Our men ran down the ridge in pursuit. In the midst of a group of Confederate dead and wounded they found the brave colonel dead, the flag he carried spread over him where he fell.

Soon after 5 o'clock Thomas rode to the left of his line, leaving Granger the ranking officer at the center. The ammunition of both Thomas's and Granger's commands was now about exhausted. When Granger had come up he had given ammunition to Brannon and Wood, and that had exhausted his supply. The cartridge-boxes of both our own and the enemy's dead within reach had been emptied by our men. When it was not yet 6 o'clock, and Thomas was still on the left of his line, Brannon rushed up to Granger, saying, "The enemy are forming for another assault; we have not another round of ammunition—what shall we do?" "Fix bayonets and go for them," was the reply. Along the whole line ran the order, "Fix bayonets." On came the enemy—our men were lying down. "Forward," was sounded. In one instant they were on their feet. Forward they went to meet the charge. The enemy fled. So impetuous was this counter-charge that one regiment, with empty muskets and empty cartridge-boxes, broke through the enemy's line, which, closing in their rear, carried them off as in the undertow.

One more feeble assault was made by the enemy; then the day closed, and the battle of Chickamauga was over. Of the 3700 men of the Reserve Corps who went into the battle that afternoon, 1175 were killed and wounded; 613 were missing, many of whom were of the regiment that broke through the lines. Our total loss was 1788, nearly 50 per cent.

Gordon Granger was rough in manner, but he had a tender heart. He was inclined to insubordination, especially when he knew his superior to be wrong. Otherwise he was a splendid soldier. Rosecrans wrote of him, "Granger, great in battle."



GENERAL THOMAS'S BIVOUAC AFTER THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.

THE CRISIS AT CHICKAMAUGA.

BY GATES P. THRUSTON, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

On the staff of General McCook at the battle of Chickamauga.

... When Longstreet struck the right, Rosecrans was near McCook and Crittenden. Seeing our line swept back, he hurried to Sheridan's force for aid. With staff and escort he recklessly strove to stem the tide. They attempted to pass to the left through a storm of canister and musketry, but were driven back.

All became confusion. No order could be heard above the tempest of battle. With a wild yell the Confederates swept on far to their left. They seemed everywhere victorious. Rosecrans was borne back in the retreat. Fugitives, wounded, caissons, escort, ambulances, thronged the narrow pathways. He concluded that our whole line had given way, that the day was lost, that the next stand must be made at Chattanooga. McCook and Crittenden, caught in the same tide of retreat, seeing only rout everywhere, shared the opinion of Rosecrans, and reported to him for instructions and coöperation.

Briefly, this is the story of the disaster on our right at Chickamauga: We were overwhelmed by numbers; we were beaten in detail. Thirty minutes earlier Longstreet would have met well-organized resistance. Thirty minutes later our marching divisions could have formed beyond his column of attack.

But Longstreet had now swept away all organized opposition in his front. Four divisions only of the Union army remained in their original position—Johnson, of McCook's corps; Palmer, of Crittenden's, and Baird and Reynolds, of Thomas's.

Three had been cut off and swept away. Longstreet's force separated them. He says he urged Bragg to send Wheeler's cavalry in pursuit. Strange to report, no pursuit was ordered.

An incident of the battle perhaps contributed to the delay. When Sheridan and others were sent to the left, the writer hastened down toward Crawfish Springs, instructed by McCook to order the cavalry to the left to fill the gaps made by the withdrawal of infantry. I was but fairly on the run when Longstreet struck our right. The storm of battle was sweeping over the ground I had just left. Hastily giving the orders and returning, I found the 39th Indiana regiment coming from a cross-road,—a full, fresh regiment, armed with Spencer's repeating-rifles, the only mounted force in our army corps. Calling upon Colonel T. J. Harrison, its commander, to hurry to the left, we led the regiment at a gallop to the Widow Glenn's.


The sound of battle had lulled. No Union force was in sight. A Confederate line near by was advancing against the position. Harrison, dismounting his men, dashed at the enemy in a most effective charge. Wilder, coming up on our right, also attacked. Wilder had two regiments armed with the same repeating-rifles. They did splendid work. Longstreet told Wilder after the war that the steady and continued racket of these guns led him to think an army corps had attacked his left flank. Bragg, cautious by nature, hesitated. By the time he was ready to turn Longstreet's force against Thomas, valuable time had elapsed.

Brannon, partly knocked out of line, had gathered his division on a hill at right angles to his former position, and a half mile in rear of Reynolds's. General Wood came up with Harker's bri-


gade and part of George P. Buell's, and posted them near Brannon's left. Some of Van Cleve's troops joined them, and fragments of Negley's.

General Thomas, ignorant of these movements and of the disaster to the right of the Union army, had again been attacked by Breckinridge and Forrest. They were again in Baird's rear with increased force. Thomas's reserve brigades, Willich, Grose, and Van Derveer, hurried to meet the attack. After a fierce struggle the Confederates were beaten back. Thomas, expecting the promised assistance of Sheridan, had sent Captain Kellogg to guide him to the left. Kellogg, hurrying back, reported that he had been fired on by a line of Confederates advancing in the woods in rear of Reynolds, who held the center of our general line.

The men in gray were coming on the right instead of Sheridan! Wood and Harker hoped the force advancing in the woods on their new front was a friendly one. The National flag was waved; a storm of bullets was the response. It was Stewart and Bate coming with their Tennesseans. They had finally forced their way across the ragged edge of the Federal right, and were following Hood. Fortunately Thomas had just repulsed Breckinridge's attack on his left, and Stanley, Beatty, and Van Derveer had double-quickened across the "horse-shoe" to our new right. They did not come a moment too soon. The improvised line of Federals thus hastily formed on "Battery Hill" now successfully withstood the assault of the enemy. The Union line held the crest. Longstreet was stayed at last. Gathering new forces, he soon sent a flanking column around our right. We could not extend our line to meet this attack. They had reached the summit, and were coming around still farther on through a protected ravine. For a time the fate of the Union army hung in the balance. All seemed lost, when unexpected help came from Gordon Granger, and the right was saved. . . .



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. B. FORREST, C. S. A.
Commanding a cavalry corps at Chickamauga.



THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND IN FRONT OF CHATTANOOGA.
From a lithograph.

The picture shows the intrenchments occupied by three divisions of Thomas's corps. In the foreground is seen Fort Grose, manned on the left of the picture by the 24th Ohio and

on the right by the 36th Indiana. Fort Negley is at the end of the line of works seen in the middle-ground, Lookout Mountain being in the distance.

CHATTANOOGA.

BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL, U. S. A.
Commander of the Union Army at the Battle of Chattanooga.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS LEADING TO CHATTANOOGA.

PORT HUDSON, DEC., 1862, TO JULY 8, 1863.

General Nathaniel P. Banks relieved General Butler commanding the Department of the Gulf in December, 1862, and acting under orders to coöperate with General McClelland's column on the upper Mississippi, he sent a detachment under General Cuvier Grover by water (under convoy of Farragut's gun-boats) to take possession of Baton Rouge. The Confederates evacuated the town December 16, and Banks's army occupied it as a base of operations against Port Hudson. Several attempts were made to flank the latter during the winter; and all failing, it was invested in May by a land column on the east. After an unsuccessful assault on May 27, which cost 1850 men, siege operations were commenced which resulted in its surrender July 8.

HELENA, JULY 4, 1863.

While Grant was marching on Vicksburg, General E. Kirby Smith, who had succeeded to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department in February, 1863, organized an expedition at Little Rock to attack Helena as a means of relieving Vicksburg. The force was led by Generals T. H. Holmes and Sterling Price, who stormed the works, and were repulsed with heavy loss on July 4, the day of the fall of Vicksburg.


LITTLE ROCK, SEPT. 10, 1863.

The fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson led to the reinforcement of the Union army in Missouri and Arkansas, where General John M. Schofield was in command. In August, Schofield sent General Frederick M. Steele from Helena against Little Rock. The Confederates under Price abandoned Little Rock without serious fighting on September 10.

JACKSON, MISS., JULY 8 TO 17, 1863.

Immediately upon the fall of Vicksburg all the Confederate troops in Mississippi not included in the surrender were concentrated at Jackson under General Joseph E. Johnston. Sherman marched against Jackson, and, after withstanding a vigorous siege of seven days, Johnston evacuated on the 16th. In September, Sherman's and McPherson's corps moved eastward to reinforce Rosecrans's army, which at the close of the month was practically shut up in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River in the rear and the Confederates strongly posted on commanding heights in front. Grant reached Chattanooga late in October, and assumed command. Rosecrans was relieved from the Army of the Cumberland by General George H. Thomas.

... Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width through which runs Chattanooga Creek. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek, and terminating somewhat abruptly a half-mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, 2200 feet above tide-water. Just below the town, the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout



HAZEN'S MEN LANDING FROM PONTON-BOATS AT BROWN'S FERRY.
From a war-time sketch.

Creek; and west of that, the Raccoon Mountain. Lookout Mountain at its northern end rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farm-house, which is reached by a wagon road from the valley to the east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout Valley and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga Valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications on Missionary Ridge there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley toward the town so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy, with his cavalry north of the river, had stopped the passing of a train loaded with ammu-

nition and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. . . .


On the 26th Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from view from the top of Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At 5 o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket-guard and captured most of it. By 7 o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified while a detail was laying the pontoon-bridge. By 10 o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout Valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River,—a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry,—with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the Twelfth Corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were cut off and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now open to us from Lookout Valley to Bridgeport. . . . On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good sup-

ply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. . . . Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not that thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.

There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was more to be benefited by defeat than the North. The latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized peoples not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbors. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure; but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movement which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreciated



VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA AND MOCCASIN POINT FROM THE SIDE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.
From a photograph.


its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley. But on the night of the 28th-29th [of October] an attack was made on Geary, at Wauhatchie, by Longstreet's corps. When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road, and from which the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, and charged up the hill, and captured it before the enemy had time to in-

trench, taking many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's teamsters became frightened, and deserted their teams. The mules also became frightened, and, breaking loose from their fastenings, stampeded directly toward the enemy. The latter no doubt took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By 4 o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed.


In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry by capture. In the night engagement of the 28th-29th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over 150 of his dead, and captured more than 100.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back toward Lexington, Kentucky. East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread, and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt, and rice.

Stopping to organize his new command, Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October. His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about 330 miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy and much other damage done; a hostile community lived along the road; guerrilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, though he was only a short distance away. . . . On November 1st, he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear.



DEPARTURE OF THE FIRST HOSPITAL TRAIN FROM CHATTANOOGA, JANUARY, 1864, AND
INTERIOR OF A HOSPITAL CAR.
From a war-time photograph.



MILITARY BRIDGE OVER THE TENNESSEE RIVER AT CHATTANOOGA, BUILT IN
OCTOBER, 1863.
From a photograph.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single-track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command, in East Tennessee, 25,000 more, by the same road. A single track could not do this. I therefore gave an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command of eight thousand men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur, north toward Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a

broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the locomotives and cars not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. . . .

General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 182 miles. . . .

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about 15,000 troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, 5000 more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more exasperating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with despatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered General Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them, to move the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Wash-

ington despatches as best I could, urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he would be relieved. All of Burnside's despatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition should hold out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base, and to make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from


there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. . . .

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person, and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day. . . .

matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelley's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division, Ewing's, was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communication. The President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. . . .

Meantime Sherman continued his crossing, without intermission, as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hills on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite the



VIEW OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN FROM THE HILL TO THE NORTH, WHICH WAS GENERAL HOOKER'S POSITION DURING THE BATTLE ON THE MOUNTAIN, NOVEMBER 24, 1863.

The military road winding over the north slope of Lookout was built after Hooker captured the mountain. (From a war-time photograph.)




GENERAL HOOKER AND STAFF ON THE HILL NORTH OF LOOKOUT CREEK, FROM WHICH HE DIRECTED THE BATTLE.

From a war-time photograph.

IMPORTANT BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR

State Capitals are lettered thus RALEIGH. Battles are indicated by stars; those in the neighborhood of cities and larger towns thus ★, and those at other places ★

STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 150 200



PART FIFTEEN WILL CONTAIN

The Continuation of

“Chattanooga,” by General Grant


With the Assault on Missionary Ridge Described by General Fullerton (Union) and General Bragg (Confederate)

The Burnside Expedition
to North Carolina
By General Burnside



The Siege of Charleston
in 1863
By General Gillmore

Including the Story of the
Attack on
Battery Wagner



GENERAL GRANT BEFORE HIS TENT IN THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

The Confederate Ram
“Albemarle”
Described by
Gilbert Elliott, her Builder
and

The Destruction of the
Ram
Told by
Commander Cushing
Who Destroyed her



Fort Fisher
By
Captain T. O. Selfridge

And the Beginning of

The Wilderness Campaign, by General Grant

Continued in Part XVI

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